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Father and Son 
Paul Cliteur 
Being invited by his son, Amos Guiora, to contribute to this exciting proj-
ect with Professor Alexander Guiora's work as the main point of reference 
is a great honor. My own contact with Professor Guiora goes back to 
March 7, 2009, when he was kind enough to recommend my manuscript 
The Secular Outlook to the editors of Wiley-Blackwell.1 During our first 
e-mail contact Professor Guiora discussed with me one of the most impor-
tant stories in the Hebrew Bible, i.e., the story of Abraham who is pre-
pared to sacrifice his son Isaac to demonstrate his loyalty to God. By that 
time I had (and still have) the impression that this story, the story about 
the sacrifice of Isaac, was somehow of great importance for a deeper 
understanding of the nature of what we might call "religious terrorism." 
Now, religious terrorism is a central topic in the work of Professor 
Guiora's son, Amos.2 And the latter had always been crystal clear .in his 
writings about the nature of religious terrorism: it is really "religious." 
That is definitely not a widely shared opinion. Many of the terrorism 
experts see, what is commonly called "religious terrorism," as really 
political,3 or as having nothing to do with any serious conviction at all 
(neither religious nor political). Terrorists are simply mad. 
In order to gather material for his books, Am os had interviewed many 
convicted terrorists, and reflecting on firsthand experience he became con-
vinced by the authenticity of their narratives. They really believe in what 
they do. And their beliefs are really religious. 
1 And published in 2010. 
2 See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Freedom from Religion: Rights and National 
Security, Terrorism and Global Justice Series, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2009, p. 9: "Religion is used as a motivator to commit wide-scale acts of terror-
ism, to justify individual acts of violence behind closed doors, and promote hatred 
of the 'other."' And further: "Religious extremism is fundamentally and existen-
tially different from secular terrorism for it lays claim to acting in the name of the 
divine" (ibid., p. 10). 
3 This is a view defended by Jolm L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, Who 
Speaks for Islam? What a Billion Muslims Really Think, Gallup Press, New York, 
2007. 
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Why Religious Terrorism Is Really Religious 
Just as Amos, I am convinced that we cannot simply reject or ignore what 
terrorists advance about their own motivations, because it does not fit 
in with our ideas of what religion ought to be.4 "To accept the facts as 
they are, however bitter or severe" 5-that is what a real scientific attitude 
demands. 
The proposition that religious terrorism has anything to do with reli-
gion tends to meet strong opposition. Part of that opposition is based 
on, simply, a division of labor among the scientific disciplines. A cultural 
anthropologist will be inclined to explain terrorism with the tools of his 
trade. He will see group behavior.6 A psychiatrist will approach terrorism 
with a special interest in the mind of the criminal. Are there specific per-
sonality features that distinguish terrorists from the ordinary citizens? 7 I 
am inclined to presume that opposition toward the concept of "religious 
terrorism" goes deeper than that. What motivates people to vehemently 
oppose this idea of religious terrorism is the unease they feel when "a 
whole religion will be attacked." 
That last assumption is too hasty, of course. If you recognize that ter-
rqrists advance religious reasons for the things they do, this should only 
prod us to understand what they say, and reflect on what this might mean 
for the great religious traditions. And if there are certain elements in those 
traditions, which prove conducive to terrorist behavior, we can try to 
interpret them differently, or perhaps reject them more straightforwardly. 
And that brings me to the central line of argument of this essay. It 
seems to me a fortuitous coincidence that in the work of the father we find 
much the son has been looking for. In the work of the father there is much 
spelled out which the son has sensed more intuitively and implicitly. 8 In 
4 Amos gives a hilarious account of his contacts with senior police officers in 
Great Britain who appeared decidedly insistent in not looking the tiger in the eye. 
See Amos N. Guiora, Freedom from Religion: Rights and National Sec;urity, Ter-
rorism and Global Justice Series, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 2-3. 
5 W.K. Clifford to Lady Pollock, September 26, 1871, quoted in W.K. Clif-
ford, Lectures and Essays, Volume I, Edited by Leslie Stephen and Frederick Pal-
lock, with an introduction by F. Pollock, Macmillan and Co., London, 1879, p. 49. 
6 See Atran, Scott, Talking to the Enemy: Violent Extremism, Sacred Values, 
and what it Means to be Human, Allen Lane, Penguin Books, London, 2010. 
7 John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, Routledge, London and New 
York, 2005. 
8 Which is, needless to say, a much more happy situation than the reverse, 
i.e., when the son more or less has to reject all his father has been teaching. See for 
an example of the last situation: Edmund Gosse, Father and Son: A Study of Two 
Temperaments, Peter Abbs (ed.), Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1983 (1907). 
other words, the work of Alexander Guiora on the philosophy of reli-
gion, or the theology of Judaism and Christianity (and I do not hesitate to 
qualify it as such), is very important for a proper understanding of what 
terrorism experts, including Amos, have been looking for: the lynchpin 
between terrorist violence and religion. But before I can explain this more 
fully, let me start with an analysis of what Alexander Guiora writes in the 
essays in this book on the essence of Judaism and Christianity. 
On Christianity 
One element in Guiora's9 theological or religious philosophical work 
is expounding for us the intolerant attitude that pervades much Chris-
tian thought. Now nota bene, this is not about individual Christians, of 
course. It is about Christian thought. In "The Language of the Gospels" 
Guiora speaks of the ]ustizmord of that "gentle Jewish teacher from the 
Galilee, Jesus of Nazareth." Guiora speculates what would have happened 
if the spirit of universalism had prevailed over rabbinical rigor. Another 
interesting question is what would have happened if after the catastrophe 
of 70 CE a leader of the stature of Saul or Tarsus had arisen in Israel. 
The most fateful idea in the history of Christian thought, an idea that 
has troubled Christian-Jewish relationships for centuries, is the idea that 
Christianity is the "fulfillment of Judaism" that supersedes it. Alexander 
Guiora says: "Let it be said, here and now, clear and loud and in no uncer-
tain terms: those who cleave to that position are no different than funda-
mentalist rabbinical Judaism." 
In what follows Guiora gives a sharp criticism of the manuscripts that 
have become known to us as the scriptural tradition. His judgment is very 
critical. "We don't possess a copy of the original version of the Septua-
gint. That was copied, redacted, copied, and redacted again by successive 
Christian copyists and editors until eventually is has reached the form we 
have before us today." So it is "not a reliable source, it is flawed." 10 
A leading idea in that whole process was also the (again fateful) idea 
that Christianity had to separate itself from the source, i.e., Judaism. And 
the Church triumphant became "militantly anti-Jewish," even "demon-
izing the Jews." 
9 In this contribution when I refer to "Guiora," I meant the father. When I 
speak of Amos, I refer to the son. 
10 As the theologian Bart Ehrman has pointed out in Bart D. Ehrman, Mis-
quoting Jesus: The Story Behind Who Changed the Bible and Why, HarperCollins, 
New York, 2007; Bart D. Ehrman, A Brief Introduction to the New Testament, 
Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 2004. 
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Guiora's critical history of the first two phases of the monotheist 
creed11 ends with a recommendation: "My suggestion is that Christians, 
to make their salvationist-universalist religion more meaningful, need to 
rediscover Jesus the Jew and the Jewish roots of Christianity." 
You do not have to believe in Guiora's last mentioned recommen-
dation to acknowledge that his analysis of the intellectual roots of the 
conflict between Christianity and Judaism hits hard. A negative attitude 
toward the Jews, or, as Guiora writes, "demonizing the Jews," is not some 
sort of attitude problem. It is not something that can be solved by good 
intentions; it has deep roots in Christian theology. 
This view on Christianity will come as a shock to many Christian 
readers. Basically, Christianity is founded on a mistake, a fateful mistake, 
that is. The whole sad history of anti-Semitism (and now I use my own 
words and I cannot hold Guiora responsible for the way I phrase the 
matter here) is intricately bound up with the rise of Christianity. This is, 
of course, a very controversial topic. The European Court in Strasbourg 
even had to judge whether it is legally permitted to express so clearly what 
is wrong with Christian theology. This happened in Giniewski v. France 
(2006). 
On January 4, 1994, the Paris newspaper Le Quotidien published 
~n article by an Austrian historian named Paul Giniewski (1926-2011).12 
The title of the article was "The Obscurity of Error." The article contained 
an analysis of the papal encyclical Veritatis Splendor ("The Splendor of 
Truth" 1993 ). In his article Giniewski contended, "many Christians have 
recognized that scriptural anti-Judaism and the doctrine of 'fulfillment' 
of the Old Covenant in the New led to anti-Semitism and prepared the 
ground in which the idea and implementation of Auschwitz took seed." 
This analysis was contested by an organization with the name (and 
this name is revealing in itself) Alliance generate contre le racisme et pour 
le respect de l'identite franyaise et chretienne [General Alliance Against 
Racism and for Respect of the French and Christian Identity]. 13 This 
organization, we can safely assume, tries to defend the French identity. 
French identity is apparently sought in (or considered to be synonymous 
with) Christianity. The organization also seeks to conduct its defense by 
11 I use this term despite Guiora's reservations against it. Guiora considers the 
differences between on the one hand Islam and Christianity and Judaism on the 
other more important than the similarities. 
12 Giniewski is the author of dozens of books on the history of anti-Semitism 
and the Israeli-Arab conflict. See Paul Giniewski, Le contentieux Israelo-Arabe, 
Cheminements, Paris, 2007. 
13 See for a critical evaluation of the work of that organization: Charb, Lettre 
aux escrocs de l'islamophobie qui font le jeu des racistes, Les Echappes, Paris, 
2015, p. 65. 
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judicial means, because it brought proceedings against the newspaper 
and against the author of the article. This was done on the charge that 
the article by Giniewski contained racially defamatOry statements about 
the Christian community. Domestic courts convicted Giniewski, but the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg did not. The Court ruled 
unanimously that, by his conviction on this charge, Giniewski's freedom 
of expression had been unduly violated. 
In the Court's view Giniewski's words did not amount to accusing 
Christians and Catholics in general of being responsible for the Nazi 
massacres. And therefore Christians were not victims of defamation on 
account of their religious beliefs. The Court also affirmed that Giniewski 
had tried to develop an argument about a specific doctrine and its possible 
links with the Holocaust. Doing this could be considered as a contribution 
to an ongoing debate. And "it is an integral part of freedom of expression 
to seek historical truth." Besides, Giniewski's article did not incite hatred 
or disrespect, nor did it cast doubt in any way on clearly established his-
torical facts. 
So, fortunately, the right to critically assess Christianity for its atti-
tude toward Judaism exists in Europe. And rightly so. The idea that Reli-
gion II supersedes and cancels Religion I, is not an idea that has "helped 
mankind." 14 It contains the seeds of catastrophe. Making this clear is not 
only an important right, as the European Court in Strasbourg upholds, 
but also an intellectual and moral duty. 
OnJudaism 
But Alexander Guiora is not only critical about Christianity; he also 
makes some strong comments on the foundations of Judaism. The first 
thing to be noted in his "Reflections on the God of Israel from Aqedat Yit-
shak to Aqedat Yeshu from the Binding of Isaac to the Sacrifice of Jesus" is 
that Guiora embraces the projection theory of religion. He follows Xeno-
phanes15 and Feuerbach16 in saying: "In my view God was created by man, 
and thus the evolution of the God concept (Israel in our case) reflects the 
evolution of the society and culture that have created it." 
14 See on this Bertrand Russell, "Ideas That Have Harmed Mankind" (1946), 
"Ideas That Have Helped Mankind" (1946), in Bertrand Russell, Bertrand Russell 
on God and Religion, Al Seckel (ed.), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1986, pp. 
289-325. 
15 W.T. Stace, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, Macmillan, London 
and New York, 1960 (1920), pp. 40££. 
16 Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums, Nachwort von Karl 
Lowith, Philipp ReclamJun., Stuttgart, 1978 (1841). 
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Needless to say, this idea is not only unacceptable for Christians, but 
also for many Jews and Muslims. Therefore, it cannot come as a surprise 
when Guiora writes that his position is that of an "outside observer (not 
even a participant observer), without any allegiances or confessional com-
mitments other than to the truth as I see it." He says: "Sine ira et studio 
but without flinching to look the tiger in the eye." 17 Guiora even writes 
that his words will be likely "to offend almost everybody." 18 The claim 
that man created God and not vice versa also has consequences for Guio-
ra'sideas on interpretation of the Hebrew Bible and the Gospels. Guiora 
says, and here comes one of my favorite sentences in this book: "I am not 
yet another Johnny-come-lately exegete trying to squeeze fresh herme-
neutical meaning from scraps of biblical texts taken out of context, disre-
garding linguistic development, timeline, and locale, or utilizing dubious 
exegetical instruments .... " What follows is a powerful criticism of many 
passages from the Hebrew Bible where the Lord God declares he will visit 
the "iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's 
children, unto the third and to the fourth generation" (Exodus 24:6-7). 
Central to Guiora's criticism of the Hebrew Bible is the story we dis-
cussed in our e-mail conversation in 2009 and which appears in this essay 
as the Aqedat Yitshak: the sacrifice of Isaac. The story has a happy end-
ing, Guiora says, because (and this is an unexpected way to phrase it) 
"the storyteller recoiled from the very proposition, couldn't bring himself 
to conclude it to the terrible end." So a sacrificial ram was introduced as 
some sort of a deus ex machina. The story is, as Guiora says, one of the 
"constitutive legends of the nascent Israel." 
17 Also a popular attitude taken by the son, by Amos, as those who know 
him well will acknowledge. See, e.g., Amos N. Guiora, Freedom from Religion: 
Rights and National Security, Terrorism and Global Justice Series, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 2009, p. x: "I have decided that in order to make my case as 
compelling and convincing as possible I must look 'the tiger in the eye."' See also, 
ibid., pp. 2-3. 
18 Not only the right to offend should be claimed, but also the duty to offend 
when there is a conflict between truth and generally accepted lies or widely spread 
ignorance. What marks the great scientist, but also the great social reformer, is 
that they are always on the side of a choice for truth, for looking the tiger in the 
eye, never for formulations which smother truth. Some valid points are raised 
by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, "Defending the Right to Offend," The Worldpost, April 20, 
2015. This is, again, a stance that is supported by the European Court in Handy-
side v. United Kingdom (1976), where the Court decides that Article 10 (freedom 
of speech) is not only applicable to "information" or "ideas" that are favorably 
received, or regarded as inoffensive, or as a matter of indifference, but also to 
those that "offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such 
are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness without which 
there is no 'democratic society."' 
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And that brings us to one of the constitutive legends of Christianity, 
i.e., the Aqedat Yeshu: the idea, according to John 3:16, that "God so 
much loved the world that he gave his only Son, so that everyone who 
believes may not perish but have eternal life" (NRSV). Guiora: 
It is a foundational tenet of faith with most Christians that God so 
loved mankind that he sacrificed his only begotten son to atone for 
all their sins. Sins against whom? Sins against himself. And to atone 
for sins committed against him he sacrifices his own son. There's no 
deus ex machina to save Jesus from completing the terrible aqeda, 
the terrible Justizmord. 
This passage could have been taken from Richard Dawkins's The God 
Delusion19 or from Christopher Hitchens's God is not Great, 20 or from 
The Age of Reason by Thomas Paine.21 All these authors have, just like 
Guiora, severely criticized the notion of vicarious redemption. But Guiora 
is entirely original, and accordingly surprising, when he compares the 
Aqedat Yitshak and the Aqedat Yeshu and spells out what this means for 
an assessment of the moral content of Christianity in comparison to Juda-
ism. He says: "As a matter of fact, the Crucifixion is a hugely retrogressive 
step in relation to the story of the Aqedat Yitshak." 
That is indeed a remarkable difference: Isaac was spared, Jesus was 
not. That means that from an outsiders' perspective the conclusion is hard 
to avoid (these are my words) that Christianity is a deterioration compared 
to Judaism. The founding myth of Judaism is cruel suggestion. The found-
ing myth of Christianity is a cruel act. About Christianity Guiora says: "it 
is his own son he sacrifices to himself to please himself. Monstrous." 
From a nonreligious perspective one cannot but agree wholeheartedly 
with Guiora. And one can also feel thankful that he spells out so clearly 
what are objections that many intuitively feel about the foundational 
myths of both Judaism and Christianity. What will surprise some, though, 
is that Guiora does not seem to reject the whole heritage of the religious 
tradition. He speaks of "an incomparable heritage unparalleled in human 
19 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, paperback edition, Black Swan, 
Transworld Publishers, London, 2006, pp. 286-287. 
2° Christopher Hitchens, God is not Great: How Religion Poisons Every-
thing, Twelve, New York and Boston, 2007, pp. 208-210. 
21 Alfred Ayer, in his book on Paine, writes: "One thing which is clear to 
me ... is that whichever view one takes of retribution in general, there is no jus-
tification of any sort for the principle of vicarious atonement, and this fact, as 
Paine perceived, is itself sufficient to demolish the claim of Christianity to be even 
a beneficent myth." See A.J. Ayer, Thomas Paine, University of Chicago Press, Chi-
cago, 1988, p. 146. See also Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason, 1794, in Thomas 
Paine, Collected Writings, The Library of America, New York, 1995, pp. 665-885. 
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thought," viz. the book, the Bible. Here Judaism and Christianity share 
a common heritage and this separates them from Islam. Guiora rejects 
what he calls the "mantra" of the "three Abrahamic religions." So not the 
Quran but the Bible remains the central focus of his attention. And, what 
is more important, in a positive way: "Can you imagine an intellectual 
and spiritual existence without the Book?" 
The question is meant as a rhetorical question, to be sure. But for 
humanists the answer is less clear. They will say: "Of course, we can imag-
ine an intellectual and spiritual existence without the Book." 
One of the authors who answered this question affirmatively was 
Susan Stebbing (1885-1943), the first female professor of philosophy in 
Britain. In Ideals and Illusions (1941)22 Stebbing listed "spiritual excel-
lences" that were not based on any religious conviction: 
• Love for other human beings; 
• Delight in creative activities of all kinds; 
" Respect for truth and the satisfaction in learning to know what is 
true about the world and about ourselves; 
" Loyalty to other human beings; 
• Generosity of thought and sympathy with those who suffer, and 
hatred of cruelty and other evils; ' 
• Delight in the beauty of nature and in art; and to have experience of 
pain and of forgoing what would be good for oneself in order that 
the needs of others may be met. 23 
According to Stebbing this is all totally independent from religion.24 
But, of course, this does not deny that the Bible is in many respects a 
magnificent book. No one can deny this, and we do not have to. But it is a 
book that also imbibes an attitude toward the basis of morals that proves 
highly problematic in the time in which we are living. That brings me to 
the beginning of this essay: the relationship between Guiora's analysis 
of the essence of Judaism and Christianity and Amos's ideas about the 
22 L. Susan Stebbing, Ideals and Illusions, with an introduction by A.E. 
Heath, Watts & Co., London, 1948 (1941). 
23 Stebbing, Ideals and Illusions, pp. 29-30. 
24 See for other testimonies of literature which are spiritually uplifting 
without being religious: William J. Bennett, The Book of Virtues: A Treasury of 
Great Moral Stories, A Touchstone Book, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1993; 
A. C. Grayling, The Good Book: A Secular Bible, Conceived, Selected, Redacted, 
Arranged, Worked, and in Part Written by A. C. Grayling, Bloomsbury, London, 
2011; Peter Singer and Renate Singer, The Moral of the Story: An Anthology of 
Ethics Through Literature, Blackwell Publishing, Maiden, 2005; Andre Comte-
Sponville, L' esprit de l' atheisme: Introduction a une spiritualite sans Dieu, A! bin 
Michel, Paris, 2006. 
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religiousness of religious violence. What does the Bible say about vio-
lence? And how does that throw light on the contemporary problems 
with terrorist violence? Does the Bible teach us something about why 
the Kouachi brothers gunned down the whole editorial board of Charlie 
Hebdo on January 7, 2015? About why Mohammed Bouyeri murdered 
Theo van Gogh? About why the British soldier Lee Rigby was hacked to 
death in a street in London? About, well the stories are endless, are they . 
not?25 
And the world looks at these things with utter amazement. Politicians 
all carefully refrain using the "R" word or the "I" word and speak about 
"horrible deeds," "extremism," "monsters"-nowhere a tiger in sight to 
look in the eye. And yet, I think, the key to our understanding of this type 
of violence is in the essays in this book by Guiora. It is his analysis of the 
sacrifice of Isaac or rather the willingness to sacrifice Isaac. The Aqedat 
Yitshak is the key to a proper understanding of contemporary religious 
terrorism. 
Aqedat Yitshak 
To understand religious terrorism we first have to listen to what the ter-
rorists themselves are saying. Not many people are prepared to do this. 
Amos did. But he is one of the rare exceptions. Most people do not listen 
to terrorists; and if they do (or claim to do this), they very soon hear 
what they want to hear; that this is all about land, about foreign occupa-
tion,'about the West being "arrogant," etc. But if we listen more carefully 
we very often hear that the terrorists are not so much ruthless people as 
people who are very much convinced that they have a divine mission. 
They think-like Plato-the world around us is just an illusion. The real 
world is still to come. We have to prepare ourselves for that new world 
and therefore they are not afraid to die. Our laws are not their laws. Our 
state is not their state. They simply do not think that our moral judgments 
have any real basis. The only thing that counts is implementing the will of 
God, whatever that amounts to. 
Where did we hear that before? 
Indeed, this is the mentality of Abraham, prepared to sacrifice his son 
for the sole reason that God commanded it. Abraham would not only 
have sacrificed his son, but also his wife, his house, his flock, himself-he 
would have done what every true believer is supposed to do, i.e., we have 
here an unconditional loyalty to the one and only God. 
25 And not only stories connected to radical Islam (although they proliferate). 
See on Yigal Amir killing Yitzak Rabin: Amos N. Guiora, Freedom from Religion: 
Rights and National Security, Terrorism and Global Justice Series, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 11, 33, 77. 
CoMMON BRIDGES 
I hope I am not needlessly provocative when I say that the terrorists 
are the children of Abraham. That does not exclude, of course, that the 
God of Israel, during the course of the development of the biblical story, 
has changed over time. 26 That may be the case, as also Guiora makes clear 
in his essays in this book. But the contemporary children of Abraham are 
much more impressed by Abraham willing to sacrifice his son than by 
Abraham discussing with God about Sodom and Gomorrah. 
What the world is confronted with nowadays is a "~ack-to~Abraham" 
movement, back to a man who wants to sacrifice all he loves for the one 
and only God. 
There is an enormous and almost desperate quest for the root causes 
of religious terrorism, but in my view it lies there, under our very noses. 
And it is splendidly analyzed by Guiora in his thoughts on the Aqedat 
Yitshak. And here there is, perhaps, a small difference between the Aqedat 
Yitshak and the Aqedat Yeshu which make the Christian story a little bit 
more acceptable. Jesus was prepared to have himself sacrificed. Abraham 
was prepared to sacrifice someone else. Abraham was prepared to kill for 
the sake of his own phantasies; Jesus was prepared to die for them. 
I think that we will not make headway with countering religious ter-
rorism as long as we do not give this the attention it deserve&,. Not only 
is religious terrorism really religious, it also goes back to a mentality of 
religious heteronomy. What we have to do is raise children who see the 
vicissitudes of the biblical idea (both Jewish and Christian), that following 
God's commands is a sure guide for ethical living. 
26 Robert Wright, The Evolution of God, Little, Brown and Company, New 
York, Boston, and London, 2009. 
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